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RECENT DECISIONS
Easements - Prescription - Presumption of Adverseness - In an ac-
tion to quiet title to land the defendant counter-claimed alleging a pre-
scriptive easement over part of the land owned by the plaintiff which
the trial court found to have been used as a driveway by the defendants
and their predecessors in title, continuously, openly and adversely for
over thirty years. It was shown that both parties had used the driveway
since 1916. There had been no controversy over the use of it by both,
or objections by either against the other's use, nor had there been any
specific claims asserted by defendants or their predecessors in title to a
right to use the driveway. There was also no evidence of express permis-
sion to use having been given by the plaintiff, and the joint use of the
driveway was peaceful except for one or two instances when guests
at the defendant's house left their automobiles on the plaintiff's prop-
erty and they were immediately removed when he protested. Held:
when it is shown that there has been the use of an easement for twenty
years unexplained it will be presumed to have been under a claim of
right and adverse, and will be sufficient to establish a right by pre-
scription and to authorize the presumption of a grant unless contra-
dicted or explained. Christenson v. Wikan, 254 Wis. 141, 35 N.W. (2d)
329 (1948).
In general the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive right
are the same as those necessary to establish adverse possession,' i.e.
the claimant's use of the property must be adverse to the rights of the
owner, under claim of right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted and
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner ;2 however, where
an easement by prescription is claimed in a driveway, the use need
not be exclusive. 3 Where the owner gives permission to use, the use
in accord with such permission for any period will not create a right
by prescription,4 even though such permission was merely verbal.'
The principal case follows the majority rule in this country and
applies to cases where there is no proof of an adverse claim on the part
of the claimant or of the giving of permission by the owner." Such is
often the case where the dispute concerns a driveway which has been
mutually used by the claimant and owner for a long period of years
with little or no controversey. Connecticut has not seen fit to follow
the majority rule and apply the presumption of adverseness after proof
I Lindokken v. Paulson, 224 Wis. 470, 272 N.W. 453 (1937).
2 Carmody v. Mulrooney, 87 Wis. 552, 58 N.W. 1109 (1894).
3 St. Ceclia Society v. Universal Car & Service Co., 213 Mich. 569, 182 N.W.
161 (1921).
4 Wiesner v. Jaeger, 175 Wis. 281, 184 N.W. 1038 (1921).
5 Bontz v. Stear, 285 Ill. 599, 121 N.E. 176 (1918).
6 Smith v. Pennington, 122 Ky. 355, 91 S.W. 730, 8 L.R.A. (NS) 149 (1906).
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of use for the statutory period. The court of that state in the Bradley
Fish Co. case states:
"The circumstances of this class of cases are so varied and it is
so important that every circumstance should be taken into con-
sideration, that we doubt the propriety of laying down universal
and absolute rules of law as to the effect in evidence of particu-
lar facts. . . . Whether long continued use of an easement is
adverse or is in subordination to -the title of the true owners is
... a matter of fact to be decided like other facts upon evidence
and upon the circumstances of each particular case."
Under such rule the claimant retains the customary burden 8 of proving
the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive right.
Under the majority rule, followed in the principal case, the pre-
sumption places the burden on the owner to show or explain the use
by proof of some license, indulgence or special contract giving permis-
sion to use, and therefore overcoming the presumption of adverseness.
The presumption has been held not to have been rebutted by proof only
of friendship or close social relations of the parties, 0 nor where the
parties were brothers and there was no evidence of conversation be-
tween them as to the character of the use." In the Carmody case,'2 the
claimant and the owners were brothers-in-law and both worked and re-
paired the way and nothing was ever said as to the right of the claimant
to use the way. The court held that the presumption of adverse use
properly applied to such case. It was held to apply also where there
was no evidence whatever as to any arrangement between the parties ;1-3
and where there was evidence as to arrangements between the owner
and a third person as to use of the way but not as between the owner
and the claimant.14 The rule also applies where the claimant had re-
ceived permission to use the "east" way but had also, without permis-
sion, used the "west" way in which the easement was claimed.' 5
The owner in the principal case relied on Martin v. Meyer 16 as
applying here. The court distinguished it from the principal case, as
in that case the evidence while showing that both parties had worked
the driveway and had no formal agreement as to its use, never-
theless did show that the owner's predecessor had refused the claimant's
7 Bradley's Fish Co. v. Dudley, 37 Conn. 136 (1870), accord Jacobs v. Brewster
354 Mo. 723, 190 S.W. (2d) 894 (1945).8 Bontz v. Stear, supra note 5.
9 Carmody v. Mulrooney, supra note 2.
10 Sheppard v. Gilbert, 212 Wis. 1, 249 N.W. 54 (1933).
"I Burnham v. Burnham, 103 Md. 409, 156 A. 823 (1931).
12 Carmody v. Mulrooney, supra note 2.
"3 Wilkins v. Nicolai, 99 Wis. 178, 74 N.W. 103 (1898).
14 Kieffer v. Fox, 193 Wis. 361, 214 N.W. 441 (1927).
"5 Schroeder v. Moeley, 182 Wis. 484, 196 N.W. 843, 170 A.L.R. 782 (1924).
'1 Martin v. Meyer, 241 Wis. 219, 5 N.W. (2d) 788 (1942).
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offer to purchase and after a quarrel had told the claimant that he could
use the driveway so long as he was a good neighbor. The court said
that this showed permission and sufficiently explained the claimant's
subsequent use and rebutted the presumption that such use was adverse.
The principal case shows that the Wisconsin Court will follow the
majority rule and presume that use for the statutory period was adverse
where there is proof only of verbal protests against the use on specific
occasions but no evidence of the owner's having given any permission
or indulgence to so use.
PAUL F. KRUMHOLZ
Constitutional Law - Curfew Law Constitutional - Calvin W. Good-
win and his wife, Sophia D. Goodwin were convicted in the municipal
court of violating an ordinance of the City of Portland, making it un-
lawful for any person to roam or be upon any street between the hours
of 1:00 and 5:00 o'clock A.M. without having and disclosing a lawful
purpose. They appealed. The circuit court sustained their demurrers,
which alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of action and
that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The City ap-
pealed. Held: Reversed. The Supreme court stated: "the real question is
whether an ordinance such as this bears a sufficiently close relation to
the peace, safety and welfare of the public so far as to justify the in-
convenience to which law abiding citizens may occasionally be sub-
mitted." The court found that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation
to the evil at which it is directed. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 210
Pac. (2d) 577 (Oregon 1949).
Such ordinances come under the police power of the governing au-
thority, for everything contrary to public policy or inimical to the pub-
lic interest is the subject of the exercise of the state's police power.,
This is true because the possession of all rights are subject to such
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of
the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals
of the community.2 It is a general rule that in order for a police meas-
ure to be reasonable, the means adopted must be reasonably necessary
and appropriate for the accomplishment of legitimate objects falling
within the scope of the power.3 It has also been held that a state in sup-
pressing what it regards as a public evil may adopt any reasonable
measures which it may deem necessary, and the reasonableness of a
police regulation is not necessarily what is best, but what is fairly ap-
' Gross v. Commonwealth, 256 Ky. 19, 75 S.W. (2d) 558 (.1934).
2Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183,20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725 (1900).
3 11 C.J. 1075, 303.
